Political Institutions and Economic Development 2025-2026 Second Module

Course Information

Instructor: Dario A. Romero
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Office Hour: Tuesday 4:00 to 6:00 pm, Wednesday 12:30 to 1:30 pm or Thursday 5:00 to 6:00 pm

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Classes:
Lectures: Thursday and Friday 1:30 to 3:20 pm
Venue: PHBS Building, TBD

1. Course Description

1.1 Context

Course overview:

This course is an elective course. It is intended as an introduction to the political economy of institutions and long-run development. The papers will draw from political economy, development economics, and economic history, and will be both theoretical and empirical. The course focuses on how non-market institutions influence and shape the strategies and behaviors of firms and individuals. I will cover only a somewhat idiosyncratic subset of topics, including economic and political institutions, conflict, industrial policy, lobbying, clientelism, bureaucracy, activism, and the media.

I will present real-world applications of the analytical framework by examining modern and past events. These events include experiences and comparisons across different countries and historical periods. I will emphasize the applications and relevance to contemporary China. The goal is to deepen our understanding of the political and economic constraints that shape policy decisions in the modern world.

Prerequisites:

The course will assume knowledge of microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics, including growth theory, game theory, and how to run regressions.

1.2 Textbooks and Reading Materials

Class will be mostly based on academic papers listed below (the exact schedule or order may be subject to change and is open to discussion).

2. Learning Outcomes

2.1 Intended Learning Outcomes

Learning Goals	**Objectives**	**Assessment (YES with details or NO)**
1. Our graduates will be effective communicators.	1.1. Our students will produce quality business and research-oriented documents.	Yes, course evaluation will be based on preparation of a presentation and a project.
	1.2. Students are able to professionally present their ideas and also logically explain and defend their argument.	Yes, through in-class discussions and presentations.
2. Our graduates will be skilled in team work and leadership.	2.1. Students will be able to lead and participate in group for projects, discussion, and presentation.	Yes, group discussions and group assignments.
	2.2. Students will be able to apply leadership theories and related skills.	No
3. Our graduates will be trained in ethics.	3.1. In a case setting, students will use appropriate techniques to analyze business problems and identify the ethical aspects, provide a solution and defend it.	No
	3.2. Our students will practice ethics in the duration of the program.	Yes, building strict discipline in class and work ethic through regular assignments.
4. Our graduates will have a global perspective.	4.1. Students will have an international exposure.	Yes, global economy micro- and macroeconomic issues will be introduced.
5. Our graduates will be skilled in problem-solving and critical thinking.	5.1. Our students will have a good understanding of fundamental theories in their fields.	Yes, assessment of fundamental theories of development.
	5.2. Our students will be prepared to face problems in various business settings and find solutions.	Yes, assessment of problem solving in the end-of-class project assignment.
	5.3. Our students will demonstrate competency in critical thinking.	Yes, one of major goals of this course.

2.2 Course specific objectives

2.3 Assessment/Grading Details

Referee report (45%): Each student needs to write a referee report for a paper I will give a list of papers that can be chosen from for referee reports. Referee reports shall be no longer than 5 pages.

Paper Presentation (40%): The list of papers proposed for presentation will be distributed

at a later date. I am also open to paper proposals from students. Presentations can be made in groups (max. size of groups to be agreed upon later).

Class Participation (15%): You can get additional credit for active class participation (critical discussions of papers covered etc.).

Class discipline - read carefully. Violating each will deduct total score by 5 points.
1, **no mobile phone use**. Laptops/tablets permitted only for taking notes.
2, entry and exits within class time should be quiet and non-distracting.
3, attending the class means scanning your face to register your presence. If you stop attending or fail to scan your face without informing the instructor in advance, it will be considered a serious violation of course policies and may lead to consequences.

2.4 Academic Honesty and Plagiarism

It is important for a student's effort and credit to be recognized through class assessment. Credits earned for a student work due to efforts done by others are clearly unfair. Deliberate dishonesty is considered academic misconducts, which include plagiarism; cheating on assignments or examinations; engaging in unauthorized collaboration on academic work; taking, acquiring, or using test materials without faculty permission; submitting false or incomplete records of academic achievement; acting alone or in cooperation with another to falsify records or to obtain dishonestly grades, honors, awards, or professional endorsement; or altering, forging, or misusing a University academic record; or fabricating or falsifying of data, research procedures, or data analysis.

All assessments are subject to academic misconduct check. Misconduct check may include reproducing the assessment, providing a copy to another member of faculty, and/or communicate a copy of this assignment to the PHBS Discipline Committee. A suspected plagiarized document/assignment submitted to a plagiarism checking service may be kept in its database for future reference purpose.

Where violation is suspected, penalties will be implemented. The penalties for academic misconduct may include: deduction of honour points, a mark of zero on the assessment, a fail grade for the whole course, and reference of the matter to the Peking University Registrar.

AI tools requirements：

AI tools may also be used for purposes such as editing, proofreading, and improving English clarity and grammar, provided that their use is limited to these supportive functions and does not involve generating substantive content or original analysis. If you use an AI tool in your work, you must include a separate disclosure paragraph specifying which tool was used, the tasks for which it was employed, and a basic example of a prompt you utilized.

Using AI tools to complete assignments or assessments without the approval of the course instructor will be regarded as an act of academic dishonesty. Depending on the severity of the situation, penalties will be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Peking University Graduate Student Handbook.

For more information of plagiarism, please refer to *PHBS Student Handbook*.

3. Topics, Teaching and Assessment Schedule

Tentative detailed schedule (may change depending on the actual time)

Class 1	Introduction
Class 2	Economic History and Persistence of Economic Under-Development

Class 3	Escape Routes: Western European Economic Development and The First Industrial Revolution
	Enlightenment and Historical Science
	Agricultural, Commercial and Industrious Revolutions
Class 4	Escape Routes: Gershenkronian Developers
	Mechanisms: Efficient Institutions, Path Dependence, and Political Economy.
Class 5	Autocracies and Democracies
Class 6	
Class 7	Conflict and Violence
Class 8	Political Selection, Constraints, and Redistribution
Class 9	Democratizations and Coups
	Collective Action: Protests and Mobilization.
Class 10	Voter Turnout and Vote-Buying
Class 11	Lobbying, Special Interests, Money in Politics
Class 12	State Capacity and Property Rights
Class 13	
Class 14	Ideology/Beliefs
Class 15	The Media
Class 16	Nationalism vs Migration
Class 17	Students presentations
Class 18	Students presentations

This is a comprehensive list of readings for each topic. An asterisk (*) indicates readings that I will cover deep in class. Their readings (*) are mandatory as they will enhance your understanding of the various subjects we will discuss and allow you to ask questions and participate actively in the discussion.

Class 1: Introduction

Galor, O. (2011). Unified growth theory. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 2

Class 2: Economic History and Persistence of Economic Under-Development

* Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel. "The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom." Econometrica, 85(4), (2017): 1065-1091.

* Dell, Melissa, Olken Benjamin. "The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java." The Review of Economic Studies, 87(1), (2020): 164–203.

* Jia, Ruixue. "The Legacies of Forced Freedom: China's Treaty Ports." Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 96, No. 4 (2014): 596-608.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth." Handbook of Economic Growth. Vol. 1. Aghion, Philippe, and Steven N. Durlauf, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005. 386-414.

Nunn, Nathan. "Historical Development." Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 2, Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, eds. Elsevier (2014): 347-402.

Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and James A. Robinson. "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone." Journal of Political Economy 122 (2): 319-368.

Schirmer, Stefan, Latika Chaudhary, Metin Cosgel, Jean-Luc Demonsant, Johan Fourie, Ewout Frankema, Giampaolo Garzarelli, John Luiz, Martine Mariotti, Grietjie Verhoef, and Se Yan. "The State and Scope of the Economic. History of Developing Regions," Economic History of Developing Regions 25.1 (2010): 3-20.

Dell, Melissa. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." Econometrica 78(6) (2010): 1863-1903.

Bertocchi, Graziella, and Arcangelo Dimico. "Slavery, Education, and Inequality." European Economic Review Vol. 70, Issue C (2014): 197-209.

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. "The Political Legacy of American Slavery." Journal of Politics 78(3) (2016): 621-641.

Naritomi, Joana, Rodrigo R. Soares, and Juliano J. Assunção. "Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil." The Journal of Economic History 72.02 (2012): 393-422.

Dippel, Christian. "Forced Coexistence and Economic Development: Evidence from Native American Reservations." Econometrica Vol. 82 No. 6 (2014): 2131-2165.

Huillery, Elise. "History matters: The Long-term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(2) (2009):176–215.

Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." American Economic Review 101 (2011): 3221-3252.

Heinrich, Joseph. The Secret of Our Success. Princeton University Press, 2017. Print.

Class 3: Escape Routes: Western European Economic Development and The First Industrial Revolution

*Hanlon, Walker. "Necessity is the Mother of Invention: Input Supplies and Directed Technical Change." Econometrica 83(1) (2015): 67-100.

*Juhasz, Reka. "Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade." American Economic Review 108(11) (2018): 3339-76.

Kelly, Morgan and Cormac O Grada. "Adam Smith, Watch Prices, and the Industrial Revolution." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4) (2016): 1727-1752.

Clark, Gregory. "The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1209-2004." Journal of Political Economy 113(6) (2005): 1307-1340.

Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of our Time. Beacon Hill: Beacon Press, 1957. Print.

Allen, Robert. The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2009. Print.

Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution." American Economic Review (2011): 3286-3307.

Brenner, Robert. "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Preindustrial Europe." Past and Present (1976): 30-75.

Fouquet, Roger and Stephen Broadberry. "Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline." Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 29 No. 4 (2015): 227-244

Allen, Robert. "Engels' pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the British industrial revolution." Explorations in Economic History Vol 46, Issue 4 (2009): 418-435.

Dedeo, Simon, Tim Hitchcock, and Sara Klingenstein. "The Civilizing Process in London's Old Bailey." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111(26) (2014): 9419-9424.

White Jr, Lynn. "Stirrup, Mounted Shock Combat, Feudalism and Chivalry." Medieval Technology and Social Change (1964): 1-38.

Allen, Robert. "The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War." Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001): 411-447.

Class 3: Enlightenment and Historical Science

*Dittmar, Jeremiah and Siebold, Skipper ""Media, Markets, and Radical Ideas: Evidence from the Protestant Reformation"

*Squicciarini, Mara and Voigtlander, Nico. "Human Capital and Industrialization: Evidence from the Age of Enlightenment." Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4) (2015): 1825-1883.

Mokyr, Joel. "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth." The Journal of Economic History Vol. 65 No. 2 (2005): 285-351.

David, Paul. "The Historical Origins of Open Science." Capitalism and Society Vol 3(2) (2008): 1-106.

Allan, Colin, Simon Dedeo, Jaimie Murdock. "Exploration and Exploitation of Victorian Science in Darwin's Reading Notebooks." Cognition 159 (2017): 117-126.

Petra Moser "Patents and Innovation in Economic History. Annual Review of Economics, Volume 8, 2016

Class 3: Agricultural, Commercial and Industrious Revolutions

*Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. "The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from an Historical Experiment." Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2) (2011): 593-650.

Cantoni, Davide and Noam Yuchtman. "Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution." Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(2) (2014): 823-887.

Voth, Hans-Joachim. "Time and Work in Eighteenth-Century London." The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 58, No. 1 (1998): 29-58.

Class 4: Escape Routes: Gershenkronian Developers

*Qian, Nancy and Pierre Yared. "The Institutional Causes of Famine in China, 1959-61." The Review of Economic Studies. 82(4) (2015): 1568-1611.

*Liu, Ernest. "Industrial Policies and Economic Development." Working paper.

*Lane, Nathan. "Manufacturing Revolutions: Industrial Policy and Networks in South Korea." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 140(3) (2025) 1683-1741.

*Koyama, Mark, Chiaki Moriguchi, and Tuan-Hwee Sng. "Geopolitics and Asia's Little Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of State Building in China and Japan after 1850." 155 (2018): 178-204.

Montinola, Gabrielle, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast. "Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic success in China." World Politics Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995): 50-81.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Harvard University Press, 1962. Print.

Hayek, Friedrich. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." The American Economic Review 35(4) (1945): 519-530.

Krugman- Fall and Rise of Economic Development: http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/dishpan.html

Weitzman, Martin. "Prices vs. Quantities." Review of Economic Studies 41(4) (1974): 477-491

Amsden, Alice. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford University Press, 1992. Print.

Wade, Robert. Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization. Princeton University Press, 1990. Print.

Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton University Press, 1995. Print.

Class 4: Mechanisms: Efficient Institutions, Path Dependence, and Political Economy

*Bleakley, Hoyt and Jeffrey Lin. "Portage: Path Dependence and Increasing Returns in U.S. History. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012): 587-644.

*Krugman, Paul. "History vs Expectations" Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(2) (1991): 651-667.

Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier. "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions." Journal of Political Economy, 132(5) (2024): 1485-1564.

Demsetz, Harold. "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review 57(2) (1967): 347-359.

Davis, Donald and Weinstein, David. "Bombs, Bones, and Breakpoints: The Geography of Economic Activity." American Economic Review 92(5) (2002): 1269-1289.

Mary A. Burke. and Young, H. Peyton "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: a Case Study of Illinois Agriculture." American Economic Review (2001): 559-573.

Young, H. Peyton. "The Economics of Convention." The Journal of Economic Perspectives (1996): 105-122.

Bowles, Samuel, Sung-Ha Hwang and Suresh Naidu. "Social Conflict and the Evolution of Conventions." Journal of the European Economic Association. 22(5) (2024): 2261-2293

David, Paul A. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review (1985): 332-337.

Liebowitz, Stan J., and Stephen E. Margolis. "The Fable of the Keys." Journal of Law and Economics (1990): 1-25.

Class 5 and 6: Political Power: Autocracies and Democracies

*Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4) (2000): 1167-1199.

*Padr´o i Miquel, Gerard "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear," Review of Economic Studies, 2007. 74(4): 1259-1274.

*Dell, Melissa. "Path dependence in development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution." Working Paper.

* Aidt, T.S. and Franck, R. (2015), Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. Econometrica, 83: 505-547.

*Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. "De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence." American Economic Review 96(2) (2006): 325-330.

*Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, "A Theory of Political Transitions" American Economic Review, 91(4): (2001) 938-963.

*Martinez-Bravo, M., Mukherjee, P. and Stegmann, A. (2017), The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence From Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia. Econometrica, 85: 1991-2010.

Roland Hodler, Paul A. Raschky, Regional Favoritism , *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2014. 129(2): 995–1033

Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico, Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004. 119(2): 707–765

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi "Endogenous Political Institutions," Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: (2004) 565-612.

Robert Barro "Determinants of Democracy", Journal of Political Economy December 1999. Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." London School of Economics

Class 7: Conflict and Violence

*Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95.

*Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom. "Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, 2013(29): 235-266.

*König, Michael and Rohner, Dominic and Thoenig, Mathias and Zilibotti, Fabrizio. "Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa" Econometrica, 85(4). (2017)

Hirshleifer, Jack. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity." The American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 130–34.

Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach." Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 4 (2004): 725–53.

Oeindrila Dube, Juan F. Vargas, "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia, The Review of Economic Studies", 2013: 80(4), 1384–1421,

Fearon James, Laitiin David. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review. 2003;97(1):75-90.

Bazzi, Samuel, and Christopher Blattman. 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices."*American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6 (4): 1–38.

Trebbi, Francesco, and Eric Weese. Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures. Econometrica, March, 87(2) (2019): 463-496.

Trebbi, Francesco, Eric Weese, Austin Wright, and Drew Shaver. "Insurgent Learning" Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, September, 1(3) (2020): 417-448.

Class 8: Political Selection, Constraints, and Redistribution

*Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89, no. 5 (1981): 914–27.

*Fujiwara, Thomas. "Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: evidence from Brazil." Econometrica Vol. 83, No.2 (2015): 423-464.

*Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*. 2009;103(2):147-174.

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Enrico Tabellini. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT press, 2002. Print. (Chapters 2, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3)

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, and Pascual Restrepo. "Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality." Handbook of Income Distribution. Vol. 2. Atkinson and Bourguignon, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2014

Holland, Alisha. "Forbearance." American Political Science Review 110(2) (2016): 232-246.

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Roberto Perotti and Massimo V. Rostagno "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(2), (2002): 609-657

Class 9: Democratizations and Coups

*Dube, Arin, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu. "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information." Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011): 1375-1409.

*Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, James A. Robinson. "Democracy Does Cause Growth" Journal of Political Economy, 127(1), (2019 47-100.

Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. "How is Power Shared in Africa?" Econometrica Vol. 83, No. 2 (2015): 465-503.

Mukand, Sharun and Rodrik, Dani. "The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy." The Economic Journal 130(627) (2020) 765-792.

Class 9: Collective Action: Protests and Mobilization

* Davide Cantoni, David Y Yang, Noam Yuchtman, Y Jane Zhang, Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2019. 134(2):1021–1077

*Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott "Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4) (2013): 1633-1685.

Wood, Elisabeth. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.

Passarelli, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini. "Emotions and Political Unrest." Journal of Political Economy 125(3) (2017).

Class 10: Voter Turnout and Vote-Buying

*Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J. Butler. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House." Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004): 807-859.

* Alesina, Alberto. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters." *The American Economic Review*, 1988, 78(4): 796–805

* Stockes, Susan C. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 315–25.

Kawai, Kei, and Yasutora Watanabe. "Inferring Strategic Voting." American Economic Review, 103(2) (2013): 624-62.

Campante, Filipe. "Redistribution in a Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions" Journal of Public Economics 95(7-8): 646-656, August 2011.

Spenkuch, Jörg L., and David Toniatti. "Political Advertising and Election Results." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133, no. 4 (2018): 1981–2036.

Michelson, Melissa R. and David W. Nickerson. "Voter Mobilization." The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science. James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia (eds.). NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 228-240.

Della Vigna, Stefano, John List, Ulrike Malmendier and Gautam Rao. "Voting to Tell Others." The Review of Economic Studies, 84(1) (2016): 143-181.

Gerber, Alan S. and Donald P. Green. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." American Political Science Review (2000): 653-663.

Nannicini, Tommaso, Francesco Trebbi, Chad Kendall, and C. E. S. Seminar. "How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign." American Economic Review 105(1) (2015): 322-353.

Thomas Fujiwara, "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 6: No. 3–4, (2011) :197-233.

Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro. "The Performance of Pivotal Voter Models in small-scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda." Journal of Public Economics 92.3 (2008): 582-596.

Class 11: Lobbying, Special Interests, Money in Politics

* Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubín. "Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines." *The American Economic Review* 107, no. 10 (2017): 3006–37.

*Baland, Jean-Marie and James Robinson. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile." American Economic Review (2008): 1737–1765.

*Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2014. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." American Economic Review, 104(12): 3885-3920.

Vidal, Jordi Blanes I., Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. "Revolving door lobbyists." The American Economic Review 102.7 (2012): 3731-3748.

Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan, and Carlos Varjao. "Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage." Working Paper.

Drutman, Lee. The Business of America is Lobbying. Oxford University Press, 2015. Print.

Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A. Robinson. "The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile." American Journal of Political Science 56.3 (2012): 601-619.

Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3 (2011): 196-214.

Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. "Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the US Electorate, 1964–2004." Journal of Politics 69.2 (2007): 430-441.

Larreguy, Horacio A., Cesar E. Montiel Olea, and Pablo Querubin. "Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teacher's Union.", American Journal of Political Science 61(4) (2017): 877-891.

Kang, Karam. "Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 83(1), (2016): 269-305.

Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J.S., "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence", European Journal of Political Economy, 18, (2002): 263–280.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." American Economic Review, 95 (2005):347–373

Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and Giovanni Maggi. "Protection for sale: An empirical investigation." American Economic Review 89.5 (1999): 1135-1155.

Feldmann, Sven and Morten Bennedsen. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions", Journal of Public Economics, 90.4-5, 631-656, 2006.

Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi, "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8) (2011): 587-611.

Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi, "Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?" Journal of International Economics, 87(1) (2012): 18-26.

Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi, "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Summer 2019.

Olson, Mancur," The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (1965).

Potters, Jan, and Frans Van Winden. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information." Public Choice 74, no. 3 (1992): 269-92.

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Ray Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi. "Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence". American Economic Review. 110(7) (2020): 2065-2102.

Class 12 and 13: State Capacity and Property Rights

* Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. "State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach." American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 8 (2015): 2364-2409.

* Libecap, Gary D., and Dean Lueck. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions." Journal of Political Economy 119.3 (2011): 426-467.

*de la Sierra, Raul Sanchez. "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." (2015). Journal of Political Economy, 128(1) (2020): 32-74

*Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane, Pablo Querubin. "The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam." Econometrica. 86(2) (2018): 2083-2121

* Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2013), Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. Econometrica, 81: 113-152.

* Leander Heldring, The Origins of Violence in Rwanda, The Review of Economic Studies, 2012, 88(2): 730–763.

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