Foreign MNEs from latecomer countries are often portrayed as aggressively recruiting technological talent and thereby threatening host-country advantage. Yet whether—and how—these MNEs can springboard via hiring remains unclear. Using archival data on 486 MNEs operating in the U.S. (1999–2016) and interviews with skilled inventors, we uncover a paradox in the springboard-via-hiring logic: externally, weak IPR reputations deter skilled inventors, limiting recruitment; internally, even when talent is hired, home-country–imprinted routines constrain post-hire learning, yielding primarily incremental innovation. This paradox is mitigated when MNEs have greater exposure to host-country IPR enforcement. Our findings refine the springboard perspective by specifying whether and when hiring-based upgrading is effective, inform IPR and FDI policies for advanced economies and springboarding strategies for latecomer MNEs, amid geopolitical tensions.