Timely Negotiations
Deadlines often disrupt negotiations and lead to unwanted impasses, yet how to mitigate these effects is still an open question. We conduct a laboratory experiment to identify mechanisms that reduce bargaining impasses. Theoretical predictions suggest that uncertain deadlines—where the timing of the deadline is not fixed but follows a probabilistic process—should improve negotiation outcomes by limiting ...
Olivier Bochet, Manshu Khanna, Simon Siegenthaler
Working Paper | No. 20250303 |
Keywords: Bargaining, Negotiations, Deadlines, Anchoring, Brinkmanship, Range Offers.
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How do Workers Learn? Theory and Evidence on the Roots of Lifecycle Human Capital Accumulation
How do the sources of worker learning change over the lifecycle, and how do these changes impact human capital and wages? Using data from Germany and the US, we document that workers’ reliance on internal learning (learning from coworkers) decreases with experience, while external learning (on-the-job training) follows an inverted U-shape. Based on this evidence, we develop a search model featuring ...
Xiao Ma, Alejandro Nakab, Daniela Vidart
Working Paper | No. 20250302 |
Keywords: On-the-job learning; Human capital accumulation; Lifecycle wage growth
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Who Pays for Training? Theory and Evidence on Firm-Level Differences in Training Investments
We investigate how on-the-job training varies with firm characteristics and how this informs the distribution of training costs between firms and workers. Analyzing data from over 100 countries, we find that smaller firms consistently offer fewer training opportunities to their workers. Using administrative data from China and Mexico, we identify differences in labor share and productivity levels as ...
Xiao Ma, Alejandro Nakab, Daniela Vidart
Working Paper | No. 20250301 |
Keywords: On-the-job training; Human capital accumulation; Firm heterogeneity
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Let the Good Times Roll: Subjective Expectations and Asset Management
Using a unique regulation implemented in a developing financial market – the mandatory disclosure of macroeconomic and security-market outlooks required of all Chinese mutual funds – we construct direct measures of portfolio managers’ subjective expectations and their influence on asset allocation decisions. Despite their sophisticated skills, high-powered incentives, and access to extensive information,...
Francesco D
Working Paper | No. 20250104 |
Keywords: subjective expectations, belief formation, extrapolation, mutual funds, asset allocation
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Competition, Cannibalization, and New Product Introductions: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
When there is uncertainty about a new product’s net value, firms treat the timing of the product launch as a real option. When the potential cannibalization costs imposed on existing products are important, the timing decisions are sensitive to competitors’ actions, as they affect these costs. In the pharmaceutical industry, we show that firms often delay new launches until generic entry threats ...
Yuanfang Chu, Sudipto Dasgupta, Fangyuan Ma
Working Paper | No. 20250103 |
Keywords: innovation, product launch, competition, creative destruction, real option
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Fake Entry
We show the financial interests of a generic-drug manufacturer's largest shareholders in a branded competitor predict the generic's likelihood of being the first to challenge a drug patent. Conditional on a challenge, these common-ownership links predict settlements and delayed generic entry in exchange for payments to the generic. The stock price reactions are positive for the brand but negative for the generic, implying wealth transfers from one portfolio firm to another, with net benefits to investors. These facts suggest that in supracompetitive markets, corporate objectives depend on shareholder preferences.
Martin Schmalz, Jin Xie
Working Paper | No. 20250102 |
Keywords: ownership, corporate objective, corporate governance
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Nominal Rigidities, Earnings Manipulation, and Securities Regulation
How does output-price stickiness affect managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings and their firms' financing costs? We show firms with sticky-output prices experience more negative returns during tight windows around the Enron scandal and are more likely to misreport earnings when securities regulation is lenient, and their misreporting drops significantly after regulation becomes stringent. Sticky-price firms also face improved credit-market conditions following securities regulation. We build a model of earnings manipulation with endogenous manipulation costs to rationalize our empirical findings. The study suggests firms' stickiness in product pricing facilitates insiders' selfinterested behavior, imposing agency costs on firms.
Erica Xuenan Li, Pengfei Wang, Jin Xie, Ji Zhang
Working Paper | No. 20250101 |
Keywords: nominal rigidities, earnings manipulation, agency cost, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, credit market
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Multinational Expansion in Time and Space
This paper studies the expansion patterns of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in time and space. Informed by a set of facts documented using a panel of US MNEs, we develop a multi-country general equilibrium dynamic model featuring a rich structure of costs to firm expansion into host and export markets. We introduce a novel compound-option formulation for the firm problem, which captures the spatial heterogeneity observed in the data. Using the calibrated model, our quantitative applications reveal that both the spatial and time dimensions of MNE activities matter for predicting the effects of globalization shocks.
Stefania Garetto, Xiao Ma, Lindsay Oldenski, Natalia Ramondoy
Working Paper | No. 20241204 |
Keywords: Multinational firms, foreign direct investment, firm dynamics, sunk costs
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Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing
We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing commitments of member states. We identify a unique choice rule that addresses feasibility while balancing priorities and capacities. We examine the effects of both homogeneous and heterogeneous burdensizes among asylum seekers on the matching process. Our main result shows that when all asylum seekers are treated as having identical burden-sizes, the asylum-seeker-proposing cumulative offer mechanism guarantees both stability and strategy-proofness. In contrast, when burden-sizes vary, there are scenarios where achieving stability or strategy-proofness is no longer possible.
Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
Working Paper | No. 20241203 |
Keywords: matching theory, market design, stability, asylum assignment
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Information Design for Social Learning on a Recommendation Platform
A recommendation platform sequentially collects information about a new product revealed from past consumer trials and uses it to better guide later consumers. Because consumers do not internalize the value of information they bring to others, their incentive for trying out the product can be socially insufficient. Given such a challenge, I study how the platform can improve social welfare by designing its recommendation policy. In a model with binary product quality and general trial-generated signals, I find that the optimal design features a U-shaped sequence of recommendation standards over the product’s life, and the optimal learning dynamic can involve temporary suspensions following negative consumer feedback when the product is young. Various extensions and comparative statics regarding the optimal recommendation standards are provided. My analysis also illustrates the usefulness of a Lagrangian duality approach for dynamic information design.
Chen Lyu*
Working Paper | No. 20241201 |
Keywords: information design, social learning, recommendation platform, Lagrangian duality
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