Information Disclosure and Peer Innovation: Evidence from Mandatory Reporting of Clinical Trials
2026-03-26 14:25:39

In 2007, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) required pharmaceutical companies to publicly disclose the entire process of their clinical trials, including trial design, sample size, progress milestones, and final results, covering both successes and failures. This reform made the previously opaque FDA process more transparent, providing peers with unprecedented sources of information. But does transparency lead to improved industry efficiency through learning, or intensified competition and weakened innovation incentives?


This paper exploits institutional differences before and after the FDAAA's implementation to construct a novel quasi-natural experiment. The research team collected extensive clinical trial data, tracking key behaviors such as new project initiations, project suspensions, and peer reactions to evaluate the causal effects of the mandatory disclosure reform. The results show that the disclosure system significantly altered firms' R&D decisions. On one hand, with more failure risks disclosed, firms can more quickly identify potential R&D "dead ends" and are more inclined to suspend projects that may fail in advance, thereby avoiding wasted investment. On the other hand, due to heightened transparency leading to intensified competition and increased imitation risks, many firms become more cautious when initiating new projects, especially in high-risk or uncertain areas, leading to a decline in new project initiations.


The study also finds that the mandatory disclosure system brings significant "peer learning effects." When one firm discloses the details of a trial failure, other firms in the same field often adjust their directions quickly, reducing repeated trial and error. In this process, the overall quality of innovation in the industry improves, while the quantity of innovation declines due to increased risk aversion. Innovation becomes "more precise," but not necessarily "more active."


This study indicates that institutional reforms play a positive role in enhancing R&D efficiency and reducing resource waste but also bring the side effect of diminished innovation vitality. The research team reminds regulators that, when designing disclosure systems, they should find a balance between "transparency promoting efficiency" and "protecting innovation incentives." The study provides important evidence for understanding the mechanisms of pharmaceutical innovation and offers new insights for policymakers on how to support breakthrough innovation.


About the Researcher

Seungjoon Oh is a tenured associate professor at Peking University HSBC Business School. He holds a PhD in Finance from the University of Michigan. His research focuses on entrepreneurial finance, corporate innovation, corporate governance, and venture capital. His work has been published in leading journals such as The Accounting Review, Review of Accounting Studies, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Banking & Finance, among others. 



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